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4EXECUTIvE SUMMARY
‘RUSSIAN-SPEAKING’ FIGHTERS IN SYRIA, IRAQ AND AT HOME: CONSEQUENCES AND CONTEXT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The conflict in Syria and Iraq, now in its sixth year, has generated considerable interest and concern 
for its potential impact on regional and international stability. Despite this interest, however, 
significant aspects of the conflict remain understudied and poorly understood. This report seeks to 
address one of these neglected areas by examining and contextualising the involvement of people 
from Russia and the former Soviet Union. The report is divided into four parts – two looking at the 
contemporary situation and two identifying lessons from the evolution of conflict in the North 
Caucasus – and offers the following conclusions:
• Assessing the ‘Russian-speaking’ Contingent in Syria & Iraq: It is impossible to estimate 
exact numbers using open-source information, but evidence points to the large-scale 
mobilisation of ‘Russian-speaking’ fighters, particularly from the North Caucasus. They are 
present across groups – the boundaries between which are often fluid – that are mutually 
hostile to Russia but divided over the legitimacy of targeting civilians.
• The extent and limits of Russia’s domestic terrorism threat: The North Caucasus insurgency 
is now allied to the Islamic State (IS) but is in long-term decline, and IS has to date 
demonstrated limited capacity in Russia. However, Russia’s domestic terrorism threat 
extends beyond both IS and returnees from Syria and Iraq, with domestic recruits and 
Turkic and Central Asian networks adding to a complex security picture.
• Learning from foreign fighters in the North Caucasus: The North Caucasus conflict highlights 
how ideologues, personal ties, and trust are crucial to the development of foreign fighter 
networks. Foreign fighters left a lasting legacy in the region, but ultimately failed to adapt 
to changing circumstances.
• Interpreting the evolution and decline of an insurgency: The North Caucasus insurgency 
illustrates how rebel leaders need to balance competing agendas to be successful, and 
how succession is a negotiated process that becomes increasingly difficult. Weakness and 
state pressure played a key role in driving ideological change, and the loss of ideological 
leaders and low levels of trust and morale undermined the insurgency’s appeal. 
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PART ONE: ASSESSING THE ‘RUSSIAN-SPEAKING’ CONTINGENT 
IN SYRIA & IRAQ
People from around the world have migrated to the conflict in Syria and Iraq in unprecedented 
numbers, and citizens of Russia and other former Soviet states have accounted for a significant 
proportion of this ‘foreign fighter’ contingent. This has generated security concerns about whether 
they are likely to remain in theatre, return home, or migrate to other locations – either as combatants 
or civilians. The first section of this report addresses these concerns by looking at the origins, 
biographies, and stated positions of this contingent and offers the following conclusions:
• At the time of writing in mid-May 2017, Russian officials estimate that up to 4,000 Russian 
citizens have travelled to Syria and Iraq, with an additional 5,000 coming from former 
Soviet countries. This information cannot be independently verified and can only serve as 
a rough guide.
• Data from Syria-related convictions support official claims that the majority of Russian 
citizens are from the North Caucasus, but also show an unprecedented nationwide 
mobilisation. The data suggests the conflict has appealed to audiences in a way previous 
– and potentially future – conflicts have not.
• Citizens of Russia and other former Soviet countries – often referred to as ‘Russian-
speaking’ because of shared cultural and historical heritage – are present in multiple 
groups, including those aligned with the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda (AQ). Clear 
boundaries exist between IS-aligned and other groups, but those between non-IS groups 
appear much more fluid.
• Several ethnic North Caucasian leaders in Syria have historical links with – and an on-going 
interest in – the North Caucasus insurgency, but are unlikely to be able to return home. 
Their groups are mutually hostile to Russia but divided over the legitimacy of targeting 
civilians, highlighting the importance of differentiating both between groups and the 
threat the pose to Russia and other countries. 
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THE CHALLENGES OF ESTIMATING HOW MANY PEOPLE HAVE TRAVELLED FROM RUSSIA 
‘Russian-speakers,’ particularly ethnic North Caucasians, were among the first external participants 
in the Syrian conflict. Indeed, several senior figures with links to the North Caucasus insurgency 
were already established by the time their involvement was publicly confirmed in autumn 2012. 
Russian official estimates of how many of its citizens have travelled to Syria and, later, Iraq, have 
lacked consistency, but have nevertheless steadily increased over time:
Figure 1: Official estimates of the number of Russian citizens in Syria and Iraq.
In February 2017, President Vladimir Putin offered the most recent of these figures: 4,000 from 
Russia, plus an additional 5,000 from elsewhere in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
Authorities in Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan have themselves reported 1,100, 900, and 508 
respectively. Kazakhstan does not appear to have updated its early estimates, but a statement that 
559 were prevented from joining and 78 have returned points to significant levels of mobilisation 
(see Appendix A for a list of official statements). Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have not been 
observed to make any official estimates. Georgia, a non-CIS country, meanwhile claimed in March 
2016 that 50 of its citizens are in Syria and Iraq. Data collected by the authors, however, suggests 
that at least that number – mainly from the Pankisi Gorge – have been killed.
All estimates of the numbers who have travelled from Russia should be treated with caution 
and can only serve as a rough guide. First, official statements lack transparency, providing little 
or no information on sourcing, time periods covered, and limitations. ‘Estimates’ offered by think 
tanks seeking a prominent media profile are consequently unreliable: The Soufan Group and the 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) are heavily reliant on these official 
figures. They also lack methodological rigour, employ flawed definitions (see Part Three), and fail 
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to acknowledge the impact of language capacity on their estimates. Academic and journalistic 
research uncritically citing these sources contributes to a stale and flawed information loop, a 
problem exacerbated by a neglect of primary sources, a reliance on ethically dubious methods, and 
a lack of understanding of context and doctrines of activism. 
Second, Russian officials and media often conflate groups – a result of both political agendas and 
ignorance. Individuals are frequently linked to IS even when evidence of alternative affiliations is 
available. As such, distribution across groups cannot be gauged from media reporting. 
Third, the media activities of groups vary considerably: IS-affiliated groups have been highly active 
on social media and have sought media exposure, whereas Adzhnad al-Kavkaz has maintained a 
lower profile and often focused on Chechen audiences. This distorts impressions of their relative 
strength. Fourth, the designation ‘North Caucasian’ (and associated designations like ‘Chechen’) 
includes not only those who have travelled directly from the region, but also people from refugee 
(e.g. Austria, Turkey), student (e.g. Egypt), and related ethnic (e.g. Georgian Kist) communities. 
Transnational diaspora ties between these communities make clear delineation impossible, as 
Russian officials themselves acknowledge (Rogachev, 2015). 
Finally, those who have travelled from Russia include migrant workers from across the former Soviet 
space, many of whom may be unregistered and not return to Russia. Tracking these individuals 
across borders poses numerous challenges, even when cross-border security service cooperation 
is intense.
RUSSIAN CITIZENS MOBILISE FROM THE NORTH CAUCASUS AND BEYOND
Russian official statements are clear that the majority of citizens to travel to Syria and Iraq come 
from the North Caucasus. Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev, for example, reported in 
April 2017 on the involvement of 2,700 people from the region. Dagestani authorities stated in late 
2015 that 600-900 residents had travelled, numbers that increased to 1,200 by early 2017. Figures 
for Chechnya increased from 405 in June 2015 to 600 in January 2017, and for Kabardino-Balkaria 
from 60 in July 2014 to 175 in February 2017. Ingushetian Head Yunus-bek Yevkurov reported 
numbers of 30 in October 2015, 87 in October 2016, and 97 in December 2016; the Ingushetian 
Interior Ministry, however, offered a figure of 200 in January 2017.
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North Caucasian residents involved in Syria/Iraq
Figure 2: Most recent official statements by local authorities on the number of residents 
involved in Syria and Iraq (as of mid-May 2017).
One of the authors has collected data on 156 Russian citizens who have been either convicted of 
travelling to Syria (72 people) or attempting to do so (76 people), or who were accused of fighting 
in Syria but were killed by security services on their return to Russia (8 people). This data confirms 
that the majority of Russian citizens have indeed travelled from the North Caucasus. However, it 
also shows recruitment from parts of the region where insurgent activity has long been limited 
(Stavropol Kray and Karachayevo-Cherkessia), as well from across Russia:
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6 Karachayevo-Cherkessia; Moscow; Tatarstan
5 Adygea; Kazakhstan; Krasnodar Kray
3 Azerbaijan; Egypt; Tyumen Oblast
2 Ivanovo Oblast; Kalmykia; Khakasia; Kirov Oblast; Khabarovsk Kray; Kostro-
ma Oblast; Kyrgyzstan; North Ossetia; Orenburg Oblast; Samara Oblast; 
Turkey
1 Astrakhan Oblast; Chelyabinsk Oblast; Chuvashia; Karachayevo-Cherkessia; 
Komi; Krasnoyarsk Kray; South Korea; St Petersburg; Tambov Oblast; Tajik-
istan; Ukraine; Uzbekistan
*Based on place of origin and/or place of residency.
 Total numbers exceed 156 because places of origin and residence may differ. Data unavailable for 4 individuals.
Only four of 156 individuals were reported as having previous convictions and seven as having 
some level of involvement with the North Caucasus insurgency. There is, however, likely to be 
underreporting of prior criminal involvement: Many media outlets are heavily reliant on official 
statements and sources and conduct little independent investigative reporting, and Russian courts 
do not appear to report all lapsed convictions. Similarly, high rates of unemployment among recruits 
(28 individuals) are likely to be distorted by a failure to account for temporary and black-market 
work. Some court documents describe people as unemployed but also reference various forms of 
economic activity.
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Employment status
Figure 3: Reported employment status of people convicted of travelling or planning to travel. 
Data unavailable for 105 individuals.
Mobilisation has occurred across age categories, although the majority have been under 30:
Age of convicted individuals
Figure 4: Age of individuals convicted of travelling or planning to travel. Data unavailable for 
34 individuals.
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This available biographical data strongly suggests that groups such as IS have mobilised significant 
numbers of participants who did not respond to appeals by domestic groups such as the Imarat 
Kavkaz (IK) (Youngman, 2016a). It highlights the importance of considering not only the appeal of 
jihadist ideology in general, but also the appeal of the conflict in Syria and Iraq in particular, since 
this may not be transferable to other groups or theatres. There is, however, anecdotal evidence of 
loyalty to groups in some cases persisting after individuals quit Syria and Iraq: The intent to continue 
insurgent or terrorist activity competes with the need for rest and recovery from injury as the 
main reasons offered for people leaving the conflict zone (11 individuals for each); disillusionment 
(2), personal reasons (2), and fearing punishment for spying (1) also feature. Available information, 
however, is sparse and should be treated with caution in the absence of detailed exit interviews.
RUSSIAN SPEAKERS PRESENT ACROSS GROUPS WITH OFTEN FLUENT BOUNDARIES
Initially, the majority of participants from former Soviet states joined the North Caucasian-led 
group that became Jaysh al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar (JMA). However, in late 2013, the group fractured. 
First, a small faction led by Seyfullakh al-Shishani broke away and ultimately joined AQ’s Syrian 
affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusrah (JN) (See Appendix B for details on the main Russian-speaking groups 
in Syria and Iraq and Appendix C for details about key insurgent personnel). Then, JMA leader and 
Georgian citizen Umar al-Shishani defected with a large number of fighters to IS (then still known 
as ISIL). Those who rejected allegiance with IS reformed under the JMA name and the leadership 
of Salakhuddin al-Shishani. However, the group became increasingly dominated by non-North 
Caucasians and ousted Salakhuddin in early 2015. Salakhuddin than established Imarat Kavkaz in 
Syria (IKS) with many of JMA’s remaining Russian-speaking fighters, until IKS also ousted him in 
late 2015 and he established Jaysh al-Usro (Paraszczuk, 2016).North Caucasians have also been 
present in several other groups, most notably Jund al-Sham and Adzhnad al-Kavkaz, led by two 
veterans of the Chechen conflict, Muslim al-Shishani and Abdul-Khakim al-Shishani respectively. 
The boundaries between non-IS groups appear to be relatively fluid and based as much on personal 
loyalties as ideological distinctions. Jund al-Sham, for example, at one point united – albeit with 
limited long-term significance – with Jaysh al-Khilafah al-Islamiya and Ansar al-Sham; its military 
emir has featured in photos alongside Adzhnad al-Kavkaz fighters; and both Adzhnad and Jund 
al-Sham have cooperated with other rebel factions in specific operations. However, the media 
operations of these groups have declined markedly in the last few years, and such propaganda as is 
produced is increasingly disseminated via closed platforms such as Telegram or WhatsApp, rather 
than open and searchable platforms like Twitter and established websites. Thus, it has become 
increasingly difficult to monitor their activities online, particularly when communications specifically 
target North Caucasian audiences. 
Central Asian fighters, many of them drawn from migrant worker communities in cities like Moscow 
and St Petersburg, have also been present across different groups. Some recruits have joined 
independent jama’ats (armed groups), while others – such as the Uzbek Imam Bukhari Jama’at, the 
Turkistan Islamic Party, and Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad – have established training facilities and 
released statements in support of various factions aligned with JN (latterly Jabhat Fateh al-Sham 
and Tahrir al-Sham) and IS, sometimes switching allegiances between them (Botobekov, 2017). 
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These groups have benefitted from long-standing clandestine networks and informal links between 
communities throughout former Soviet countries (see Part Two). The Imam Bukhari Jama’at, for 
example, emerged from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and the Islamic Jihad Union 
(IJU) – a splinter group from the IMU – has released video footage of its training camps in Syria. 
Ansar al-Jihad, another group with Uzbek, Uighur, and Turkish members, has also released video 
footage of the fall of Aleppo.
LEADERS UNITED IN HOSTILITY TO RUSSIA, DIVIDED OVER LEGITIMATE TARGETS
Unlike rank-and-file participants, many ethnic North Caucasians in leadership roles were previously 
involved with the North Caucasus insurgency. Muslim al-Shishani, for example, fought with Ibn 
Khattab, the most famous of the Arab foreign fighter contingent in Chechnya (see Part Four), and his 
successors, fellow Saudi Abu Walid and Pakistani Abu Dzhafar. According to his ‘official’ biography 
(M. al-Shishani, 2014b). – published in Russian, German, and Arabic and intended to boost his 
authority as leader – he handled Abu Walid’s financial affairs, as well as being responsible for rebels 
in Chechnya’s Sunzhenskiy Rayon and Ingushetia. He was captured in 2003 and imprisoned for 
two years; following his release, he left for Georgia. Abdul-Khakim al-Shishani similarly fought in 
Chechnya, initially under the command of another Khattab protégé, Rustam Basayev. It is unclear 
whether he fought directly with Khattab, but he served as emir of Chechnya’s Central Front until 
injury forced him to leave for Turkey. Pankisi native Salakhuddin al-Shishani’s biography is murkier 
– his identity was concealed for a long time, and he used multiple aliases to avoid extradition to 
Russia – but he fought with the North Caucasus insurgency in the early 2000s. Akhmad Chatayev, 
who assumed a prominent role in IS, likewise fought in the First and Second Chechen Wars, until he 
quit and acquired refugee status in Austria in 2003. The involvement of Abu Jihad, responsible for 
IS Russian-language propaganda, appears much more limited, but in 2010 a local court sentenced 
him to a year for aiding insurgents.
The biographies of these senior figures offer important insights into their decision to travel to Syria 
and potential future destinations. All of them, with the possible exception of Abu Jihad, left the 
North Caucasus before the Syrian conflict started, and many appear to have failed in attempts to 
return. Muslim al-Shishani, for example, returned to Dagestan in 2008, but claimed he was unable 
to re-establish links with Chechen groups, who distrusted him following his imprisonment. In 2012, 
he again attempted to return to Chechnya through Georgia, but abandoned his efforts when other 
rebel leaders became involved (M. al-Shishani, 2014a). That operation culminated in the August 
2012 Lopota Gorge incident, in which Salakhuddin and Chatayev were also involved (Public Council 
at the Public Defender’s Office of Georgia, 2014). Abdul-Khakim al-Shishani also cited failed 
attempts to return to Chechnya as a justification for travelling to Syria (A-Kh. al-Shishani, 2017). 
Although these leaders’ statements have frequently referenced the situation in, and expressed a 
desire to return to, the North Caucasus, their previous difficulties – and increased border security 
as a result of the Syrian conflict – make such a return unlikely.
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These senior leaders express mutual hostility to Russia in their statements. Those inside and outside 
IS, however, have sharply diverged on what constitute legitimate targets and acceptable tactics. 
IS has sought to inspire attacks globally as its strongholds in Syria and Iraq come under pressure; 
it has also claimed multiple attacks in Russia (see Part Two), targeted Russian interests abroad – 
most notably downing a Russian passenger jet over Egypt in October 2015 – and orchestrated a 
series of terrorist attacks in Turkey. Adzhnad al-Kavkaz, however, issued a statement in mid-2016 
denying involvement in attacks in Turkey and Saudi Arabia and questioning the ‘permissibility and 
expediency’ of such attacks, particularly in Muslim-majority countries that have previously provided 
refuge to militants (A-Kh. al-Shishani, 2016). Abdul-Khakim al-Shishani also criticised attacks on law 
enforcement personnel in Chechnya, arguing that they are not expedient given higher casualties 
among rebels than targets (A-Kh. al-Shishani, 2017). Muslim al-Shishani articulated an almost 
identical position on both issues (M. al-Shishani, 2016b; M. al-Shishani, 2017), and described the 
Russian people as a ‘hostage’ to Russian policies rather than an enemy (M. al-Shishani, 2016a). 
Although both groups have cooperated with AQ-aligned factions on the ground, their operational 
activities – at least in as far as these can be assessed from open source information – appear 
to reflect this focus on waging insurgent warfare against security services. This demonstrates 
the importance of differentiating between Russian-speaking groups in assessing the threat they 
pose. Although there is broad agreement on the legitimacy, if not the expediency, of targeting 
Russian security service personnel, attacks on civilians enjoy much narrower support. Importantly, 
operations in Turkey are viewed by some both as illegitimate and as undermining a potential retreat 
for insurgents.
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PART TWO: THE EXTENT AND LIMITS OF RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC 
TERRORISM THREAT
The threat posed by ‘returnees’ from the conflict in Syria and Iraq features high on Russia’s domestic 
security agenda but is only one of several overlapping concerns. The North Caucasus has been a 
source of instability since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the large number of people from the 
region fighting in the Middle East has prompted concerns about the potential rejuvenation of the 
domestic insurgency. Elsewhere in Russia, supporters of radical Islamist ideologies have emerged 
from among the country’s sizeable Muslim and migrant worker population, and only some of these 
have travelled to Syria and Iraq. Moreover, extremist groups throughout Russia are able to tap into 
long-standing transnational networks. This section surveys these complex threats and offers the 
following conclusions:
• The Islamic State (IS) has replaced the Imarat Kavkaz (Caucasus Emirate, IK) as the main 
insurgent group in the North Caucasus. The regional insurgency, however, has been in 
long-term decline, and IS faces the same operational pressures as the IK and has failed to 
transfer its appeal to local groups.
• IS-claimed attacks in Russia have to date demonstrated only limited capacity, mainly 
involving attacking security service personnel with basic weapons to acquire firearms. This 
suggests IS is able to mobilise supporters but has thus far been unable to support more 
substantive attacks.
• Very few returnees have linked up with the domestic insurgency, and those that did had 
only a negligible impact on its trajectory. Most planned attacks linked to Syria and Iraq 
have not involved returnees, but previously unknown actors inspired and potentially 
supported by groups operating there.
• External threats are not limited to Syria and Iraq. Caucasian and Central Asian networks 
linked to Russia-based extremists have deep roots in Turkey and Afghanistan/Pakistan and 
have been linked to attacks in Russia. The size of Russia and its migrant communities and 
the extensive nature of (non-radical) post-Soviet transnational networks create multiple 
opportunities for attacks. 
15
CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE ON SECURITY THREATS
PART TwO: THE EXTENT AND lIMITS OF RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC TERRORISM THREAT
VIEWING THE INSURGENCY’S ALLEGIANCE TO IS IN THE CONTEXT OF ITS DECLINE 
The Syrian conflict posed a challenge for the IK, as its leaders sought to balance support for those 
fighting there with mitigating the negative effects on the domestic insurgency. Ultimately, however, 
these efforts proved unsuccessful, and the splits among Russian-speaking groups in Syria (see 
Part One) replicated themselves in the North Caucasus itself. IK leaders Aliaskhab Kebekov and 
Magomed Suleymanov supported al-Qaeda (AQ) and its Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusrah (JN), while 
many of their subordinates increasingly favoured IS (Youngman, 2016b). Internal divisions became 
public when, in December 2014, the leader of the IK’s Dagestani branch, Rustam Asilderov, pledged 
allegiance to IS. Over the next few months, many other IK leaders followed suit, leaving the IK 
without prominent representation in Chechnya and Ingushetia and severely weakened in Dagestan 
and Kabardino-Balkaria. IS formalised its advance into the region in July 2015, when spokesman 
Muhammad al-Adnani declared it a province of the ‘caliphate,’ the Caucasus Wilayah (IS/CW), to be 
led by Asilderov. The IK’s already precarious position was further undermined by security service 
operations, which killed almost all of its remaining leaders. Its last surviving senior figure was killed 
in St Petersburg in August 2016.
IS/CW initially emerged as the dominant insurgent force in the North Caucasus. It too, however, 
has come under intense security service pressure that resulted in the loss of most of its known 
leadership, including Asilderov. Its sole surviving senior figure, Chechnya’s Aslan Byutukayev, is 
known to have suffered serious health problems. Indicative of IS/CW’s limited and largely reactive 
capacity, it took nine months following the first defections before IS claimed the groups’ first attack, 
and a full year before a verifiable attack actually occurred (see below). IS/CW’s weakness is rooted 
in the reasons for the long-term decline of the insurgency, which predate the Syrian conflict. The 
ideological evolution of the insurgency, which traces back to its origins in the Chechen Wars of 
1994-1996 and 1999-2002, was driven by a need to expand its support base – first from Chechnya 
to the broader region, then to Russia’s Muslims, and finally to the global jihadist community – and 
appeal to the next generation of insurgents (see Part Four). Such expansion was necessary because 
the original support base was no longer sufficient. Amnesties, sustained security service pressure, 
and general conflict fatigue had, over many years, degraded the insurgency. Furthermore, from 
2010 onwards, the authorities pursued a number of soft policies, including local commissions to 
rehabilitate insurgents and increased engagement with Salafi communities, which undermined 
support for the insurgency. Equally important, the security services increased the pressure in the 
run-up to the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, particularly in Dagestan. While this largely signalled 
the end of the soft policies in the region – and the failure to lay the foundations for stability is a key 
reason why low-level violence is likely to continue – this also contributed to a much more challenging 
operating environment. The appeal of the Syrian conflict to potential and actual insurgents cannot 
be viewed in isolation from the unattractiveness of the local conflict and perceptions that the IK 
had reached a dead-end.  Although IS/CW leaders claimed that being part of the ‘caliphate’ negated 
the necessity, and indeed the legitimacy, of travelling to Syria and Iraq, there is little evidence that IS 
has been able to translate its appeal into significant support or recruits for the domestic insurgency.
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IS MOBILISES SUPPORTERS BUT DEMONSTRATES LIMITED CAPACITY
The formal incorporation of the North Caucasus into the ‘caliphate’ complicates assessments of IS 
activity in Russia, since it leads to a conflation of domestic insurgent activity with threats linked to 
Syria and Iraq. The frequent tendency of Russian officials and media to refer to all radical Islamists 
as IS – which aligns with Russia’s broader foreign policy agenda – further muddies the waters. 
Evaluating the attacks explicitly claimed by IS helps delineate its activities from those of other 
groups and sheds light on the nature of the threat it poses. As of mid-May 2017, IS has claimed 
responsibility for 15 attacks in Russia: Of these, eight occurred in Dagestan, two in Chechnya, two 
in Moscow Oblast, and one each in Astrakhan Oblast, Khabarovsk Kray, and Ingushetia. Those 
in Dagestan are hardest to separate from regular insurgent activity, with the majority occurring 
between December 2015 and March 2016 in the southern districts where the group led by Gasan 
Abdullayev (d.June 2016) – one of the most outspoken defectors to IS – was active. Perhaps the 
most revealing aspect of IS-claimed attacks in Dagestan is that the first – an attack on a military 
barracks in Magaramkentskiy Rayon – is unlikely to have occurred. There was no observed media 
reporting of any attack in the area on the day it supposedly occurred, and both security services 
and local residents denied the very existence of the supposed target (Kavkazskiy Uzel, 2015). This 
highlights the importance of independently verifying IS claims, which sometimes display a lack 
of knowledge about the details of events even when IS involvement can be confirmed (see, for 
example, Merenkova, 2016).
IS attacks outside of Dagestan reveal more about the group’s capabilities in Russia. The first occurred 
in a Moscow suburb in August 2016, when two Chechens attacked and wounded traffic police 
with an axe purchased shortly beforehand, purportedly with the aim of seizing the policemen’s 
weapons (Pavluk-Pavluchenko & Bezrukova, 2016). This template of using rudimentary weapons 
against police in order to acquire firearms to continue the attack appears to have been replicated 
in other incidents. This includes the December 2016 attack on Groznyy, in which seven rebels and 
four security service personnel were killed (Milishina, 2016), and the April 2017 attack on Astrakhan 
Oblast, when four people killed two traffic policemen before themselves being killed in a special 
operation (Kavpolit, 2017). It also appears to have been the case for the March 2017 attack on a 
military unit in Chechnya – independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta (Milishina, 2017) cast doubt on 
claims the attackers were armed – and an April 2017 attack on an FSB office in Khabarovsk Kray, 
which was preceded by a raid on a shooting club. In the latter incident, investigators linked both raid 
and attack to known members of a far-right group and denied IS involvement (Kopacheva, 2017). 
The only other incidents outside Dagestan were an arson attack on a Moscow Oblast furniture 
factory that was not initially even reported as suspicious (Grigoriev, 2016), and a May 2017 attack 
on a police post in Ingushetia that left one policeman and the two attackers dead. One of the 
Ingushetia attackers was also accused of an April 2017 attack on traffic police not claimed by IS 
(Kavkazskiy Uzel, 2017), which – together with the timing of the Astrakhan attack claim – suggests 
attacks are not claimed if individual perpetrators are still at large. Overall, IS-claimed attacks outside 
17
CENTRE FOR RESEARCH AND EVIDENCE ON SECURITY THREATS
PART TwO: THE EXTENT AND lIMITS OF RUSSIA’S DOMESTIC TERRORISM THREAT
of Dagestan have been marked by low levels of sophistication, suggesting the group is capable of 
inspiring attacks but has to date been unable to provide more substantive support for successful 
operations.
DOMESTIC RECRUITS APPEAR TO POSE GREATER THREAT THAN ‘RETURNEES’
Russia has used the potential threat posed by returnees to justify Russian military involvement 
in Syria (Mir TV, 2017). Such a threat is not limited to IS and may be considered from two angles. 
On the one hand, returnees may exacerbate existing security concerns by seeking to join or re-
join the North Caucasus insurgency, thereby reversing Russia’s successes in degrading its capacity. 
On the other, they may generate new threats, either by returning with the intent to carry out or 
support terrorist activity, or failing to reintegrate into civilian life and continuing to support radical 
ideologies. A database of Syria-related open source material constructed by one of the authors, 
however, suggests that few returnees have subsequently engaged in insurgency- and terrorism-
related activity. Instead, most reported planned attacks are linked to those inspired by radical 
ideologies who have not been to Syria and Iraq.
There is to date little open source evidence to suggest that returnees are likely to radically alter the 
trajectory of the North Caucasus insurgency. There have been only 10 observed cases of returnees 
joining the insurgency, of whom six were killed and four arrested (one subsequently convicted). 
Although individuals have clearly succeeded in returning undetected – and actual numbers may 
be higher – it is doubtful they could do so in sufficient numbers to rejuvenate the insurgency. Nor 
does available evidence justify fears that returnees will revitalise rebel leadership cadres. Kamaldin 
Kazimagomedov and Gadzhi Abdulayev both reportedly fought in Syria before becoming leaders 
of, respectively, the IK’s Southern and Mountain Sectors in Dagestan. Both remained loyal to the 
IK after the splintering of the insurgency, but neither survived long: Abdulayev was killed in August 
2015, less than a month after being appointed; Kazimagomedov survived for almost ten months 
in his post before being killed in May 2016. Moreover, senior rebel leaders in Syria are the least 
likely to be able to return, given their prominence and previous failed attempts to return to the 
region (see Part One). Low levels of trust and fear of infiltration by spies working for the Russian 
security services have also long hindered collaboration and recruitment where personal ties are 
lacking. Even without these obstacles, any returning leadership would need to rebuild much of the 
insurgency’s organisational structure from scratch. Although there is ample evidence that jihadist 
ideologies continue to attract adherents, the threat arguably remains domestic rather than foreign 
in nature.
The number of people who have been reported to have travelled to Syria and planned an attack 
on their return is also low: The authors have identified only nine such cases as of late April 2017. 
Moreover, none of the IS-claimed attacks appear to have involved returnees. It was reported that 
the perpetrator of the 3 April 2017 St Petersburg attack travelled to Turkey, prompting speculation 
he may also have travelled to Syria, but no evidence has been offered to support these claims. It 
remains possible that the plans of arrested returnees are unknown or were not publicised, and there 
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is insufficient evidence to allow for reliable conclusions about post-return re-integration into civilian 
life. Nevertheless, the majority of those accused of planning attacks in the name of Syria-based 
groups (47 individuals in total) do not appear to have fought there; 11 instead planned to travel 
after carrying out their attacks. In most cases, however, available information on plots is limited and 
none have resulted in prosecutions, making it difficult to distinguish media speculation from intent.
TURKIC AND CENTRAL ASIAN NETWORKS CREATE ADDITIONAL EXTERNAL THREATS
Although attention invariably focuses on Syria and Iraq, these are not the only external sources 
of Russian security threats. Intensive pressure on North Caucasian Salafi communities and on the 
insurgency has resulted in both conservative Muslims and insurgents relocating to Turkey. Many of 
these have created self-sustained communities in and around Istanbul (International Crisis Group, 
2016). Those to have relocated include Chechen rebel leaders Makhran Saidov, one of the first leaders 
to pledge allegiance to IS; Aslambek Vadalov, a former challenger to Dokka Umarov for leadership of 
the IK; and Tarkhan Gaziyev, whose supporters founded a jama’at in Syria. The outflow of fighters 
has swelled the long-standing networks that have helped sustain the North Caucasus insurgency 
– providing a refuge for exhausted and injured fighters, as well as resources – and facilitated the 
flow of recruits from the region to the Syrian conflict. The charity Imkander, for example, regularly 
conducts fundraising events and rallies celebrating the ‘martyrdom’ of prominent North Caucasian 
jihadists. Russia is suspected of carrying out targeted assassinations against members of this support 
community, resulting in the deaths of at least eight people since 2003. This included the November 
2015 murder of Abdulvakhid Edilgeriyev, who fought in Chechnya, Syria, and Ukraine and served 
as an administrator for the prominent insurgent website Kavkazcenter. Many of those who have 
relocated remain hostile to the Russian state and maintain active ties with their homeland. 
Azerbaijan has also historically served as a support base. Baku-based charitable organisations, led 
by Saudi and Yemeni volunteers, channelled funds from the Middle East in the late 1990s, with 
Russian media reports claiming they were training people to foment unrest in Dagestan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan. Khattab and Abu Omar al-Sayf used foreign support passing through Azerbaijan 
and Georgia to construct training facilities in Serzhen-Yurt, Chechnya. These facilities welcomed 
volunteers from across the Caucasus and Central Asia. However, Khattab later claimed that some 
Central Asian volunteers were Russian spies (Ibn Khattab, undated), leading him to banish suspected 
individuals and curtail the influence of Central Asians at the camp. Nevertheless, Dagestani and 
Nogay groups continued to play a role in the regional insurgency throughout the 2000s, retaining 
links to Azerbaijan, other Turkic-speaking CIS communities (to which Nogays belong), and Pakistan.
Many of these networks overlap, are pan-Turkic in nature and – despite their small size relative to the 
broader communities from which they have emerged – create a security challenge that transcends 
national boundaries. In some cases, groups have benefitted from weak or absent central governance. 
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), for example, was able to establish its presence in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan in the 1990s in part because the partially governed tribal areas around 
the border afforded a measure of protection for small groups of militants, especially those aligned 
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to local tribes. After 9/11, this region continued to offer sanctuary, with new networks forming 
around localised or regional agendas. The pan-Turkic Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), an offshoot of the 
IMU, emerged after 2004 and drew supporters from Turkic-speaking communities across Europe, 
Russia, Central Asia and China. It established paramilitary training camps in Waziristan and was 
affiliated to the Taliban and supported informally by AQ. Notably, it was linked to a thwarted plot 
in 2007 against the US air base in Ramstein, Germany, which led to arrests across Europe. Osama 
bin Laden had mentioned a desire to mobilise support in Turkey (Jihadica, 2015), and by 2010 the 
Turkish authorities had responded to the threat posed by groups in Afghanistan with the arrest 
of 120 suspects (BBC News, 2010). It is likely that some of those arrested were linked to the IJU, 
which meanwhile continued to emphasise loose ties to militants in the Caucasus (Jihadology, 2011). 
A small number of Azeri volunteers also appear to have established links to groups in Waziristan, 
judging from court reports (Rafiqqızı, 2017). While their exact role remains unclear, they may have 
relied on informal channels linked to pan-Turkic groups like the IMU, the IJU, and the Turkistan 
Islamic Party, as well as AQ and the Haqqani network. 
Factionalism and infighting, coupled with targeted pressure from local and US forces, have hampered 
these groups’ capacity to build on their presence. Nevertheless, incidents including the June 2014 
Jinnah airport attack in Karachi illustrated some cooperation, even though formal ties between 
the groups were not established (Reuters, 2014). The Pakistani authorities’ response to this attack 
forced many of these groups to seek sanctuary elsewhere. Events in Syria and Iraq and the April 
2017 terrorist attacks in St Petersburg and Stockholm have, however, resulted in renewed attention 
to these networks. The St Petersburg attack was perpetrated by an ethnic Uzbek originally from 
southern Kyrgyzstan who obtained Russian citizenship, and led to the arrest of numerous people 
of Central Asian origin on suspicion of aiding the perpetrator and recruiting for Syria-based groups. 
A Moscow judge considering the arrest of one alleged accomplice stated that representatives of 
an unspecified international terrorist organisation financed the attack through Turkey (Vedomosti, 
2017). A hitherto unknown group calling itself the ‘Battalion of Imam Shamil’ claimed it had carried 
out the attack on the orders of AQ. The claim, however, is impossible to independently verify, 
although it was publicised by AQ-linked media outlets and carries echoes of previous attempts by 
Zawahiri to portray the conflict in Chechnya as a legitimate jihad forming part of a global struggle 
led, naturally, by him. Swedish authorities identified the perpetrator of the Stockholm attack as an 
ethnic Uzbek asylum seeker with ‘sympathy for extremist organisations, among them IS’ (Johnson, 
Pollard & Roos, 2017). Swedish Radio News claimed that the same group may have organised both 
attacks, citing the social media profile of the Stockholm attacker (Rosen, 2017). Again, however, 
such information cannot be independently verified.
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PART THREE: LEARNING FROM FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN THE 
NORTH CAUCASUS
The conflict in Syria and Iraq is far from the first to attract external participants. Foreign activists 
played an important role in the North Caucasus insurgency, impacting its trajectory, ideology and 
perceived legitimacy. The decline of this manifestation of the foreign fighter phenomenon can offer 
insights into how other conflicts may evolve, and how military defeat could impact groups like the 
Islamic State (IS). This section examines the evolution and legacy of foreign activists in the North 
Caucasus and offers the following conclusions:
• Shortcomings in how the ‘foreign fighter’ concept is defined and a failure to account for its 
complexity and the full range of activities transnational activists engage in undermine our 
ability to understand the phenomenon.
• Ideologues played a key role in building the North Caucasian foreign fighter network. 
Sheikh Fathi al-Shishani’s personal credibility was critical to local insurgents accepting 
Khattab, the most famous of the foreign fighter contingent. Personal ties and trust were, 
in turn, central to Khattab’s network.
• Foreign fighters in the North Caucasus formed part of a broader social movement and 
played an important role in Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) state building. They had 
a lasting impact on the tactics and ideology on the insurgency that continues to resonate 
today.
• The decline of the foreign fighter movement was attributable in part to its failure to 
effectively adapt to changing circumstances, and to the weakening of the North Caucasus 
insurgency itself. Foreign fighters suffered significant losses 1999-2002 and increasingly 
relied on small, trusted regional networks.
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‘FOREIGN FIGHTER’ CONCEPT MORE COMPLEX THAN WIDELY ACKNOWLEDGED 
Men and women have volunteered to participate in foreign conflict zones throughout history, for 
reasons of ideology, religion, or financial reward – or a combination of the three (Moore & Tumelty, 
2008). Yet until recently this phenomenon has been understudied and it remains poorly understood, 
with implications for how it is treated, the conclusions that are drawn, and the effectiveness of 
responses to it. Some think-tank and academic treatments of the topic view the term ‘foreign 
fighter’ as self-explanatory, while others draw on popularised definitions that are incomplete and 
conceptually unreliable. A widely cited definition by David Malet (2013), for example, characterises 
foreign fighters as ‘non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts’ to 
defend some form of common identity. However, numerous historical examples demonstrate that 
motivations for ‘foreign fighters’ are often shaped by religion, kinship, or ideology, with citizenship 
offering little insight. Citizenship, moreover, is not always a static variable: people who travelled from 
countries like Georgia and Azerbaijan to fight in the North Caucasus were, after all, once citizens of 
the same state. It is also important to recognise that external observers, recipient communities, and 
the actors themselves may have different perceptions of their ‘foreignness,’ and this may impact the 
reception and effectiveness of foreign fighters (Moore, 2015). A Jordanian Chechen, for example, 
may view himself first and foremost as Chechen but nonetheless by viewed as foreign by Chechens 
in Chechnya.
In another widely cited definition, Thomas Hegghammer (2010/11) builds on Malet’s definition 
to focus on those lacking ‘citizenship of the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions,’ 
and excluding those who are paid or members of an official military organisation. Yet this only 
adds further problems. Excluding kinship ties arguably means that the Pankisi Kists and Jordanian 
Chechens who fought in the Chechen wars should not be considered foreign fighters; yet, as shall be 
seen below, this would require us to ignore someone like Sheikh Fathi al-Shishani, who was integral 
to creating the foreign fighter movement in the North Caucasus. Excluding those who are paid 
would rule out many more, including many IS fighters, and impose an unreasonable requirement 
that foreign fighters somehow live in a post-capitalist world. This part of the report instead draws 
on the definition offered by Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, which avoids many of these problems 
by defining foreign fighters as ‘non-indigenous, non-territorialized combatants who, motivated by 
religion, kinship, and/or ideology rather than pecuniary reward, enter a combat zone to participate 
in hostilities’(Moore & Tumelty, 2008: 412). Such a definition focuses on how motivations are 
prioritised, rather than treating them as exclusive. Moreover, it emphasises the critical role played 
by personal and identity factors. This approach finds support in work that illustrates the role played 
by personal circumstances, family and peer groups, and wider social networks in motivating and 
enabling foreign fighters (Borum & Fein, 2017; Holman, 2015; Nilsson, 2015; de Bie, de Poot & van 
der Leun, 2015). At the same time, it is recognised that the term ‘foreign fighters’ is itself problematic, 
since transnational activists engage in a range of roles that extend far beyond combat activities. The 
term is used here because it is widely used and readily understood, but is not intended to exclude 
these other activities.
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IDEOLOGUES AND TRUST KEY TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN FIGHTER NETWORKS
Transnational ideologues play an important role in mobilising foreign fighters, using ‘mechanisms 
of emulation and the attribution of similarity’ to produce the narratives that support transnational 
mobilisation (McAdam & Tarrow, 2005). Local or domestic frames of activism, in turn, co-opt, adapt 
or integrate messages in order to construct broader narratives that draw on the arguments of 
transnational ideologues. The process of movement framing – how actors seek to shape people’s 
interpretations of the world in which they operate – is therefore an active one in which ideologues 
play an important role. ‘Dynamic mechanisms’ – from local peer groups involved in transnational 
mobilisation to broader ideological narratives – are part of ‘sequential processes’ that shape activism 
and create what McAdam and Tarrow (2005) call ‘contentious politics.’ Recent works have analysed 
the statements of leading militants to understand the processes by which militancy is diffused, 
how grievances resonate, and how leaders retain credibility (Holbrook, 2014; Youngman, 2016a). 
Importantly, this work sheds light on the ways in which ideological frames – and the movements 
that adopt them – change (Youngman, 2016b).
The importance of transnational ideologues can clearly be seen in the case of the foreign fighter 
movement in the North Caucasus. Perhaps most importantly, Sheikh Fathi al-Shishani arrived 
in the region in the early 1990s. Although he was too ill to fight in Afghanistan, his status as a 
Jordanian Chechen and his ability to speak both Arabic and Chechen afforded him credibility in 
local communities along the border with Chechnya and Dagestan (S.F. al-Shishani, undated). It was 
Sheikh Fathi who invited the Saudi Ibn al-Khattab to Dagestan in 1995 and gave him command of 
a small local militia, or jama’at. Other ideologues followed and each played a role in supporting and 
enabling the foreign fighter movement to grow.
KEY RELIGIOUS ADVISORS TO FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN CHECHNYA




Chechen Afghanistan 1992 May 1997
Abu Omar al-
Sayf Saudi Afghanistan 1995 December 2005
Abu Hafs al-Ur-
dani Jordanian
Unconfirmed – possibly 
participated in Tajik civil 
war with Khattab
1995 November 2006
Mukhannad Unconfirmed Unknown 1999 April 2011
Khattab was influenced by the writings of the Palestinian ideologue Abdullah Azzam. He viewed jihad 
in Afghanistan as ‘compulsory’ and later argued that support for Muslim brothers was an ‘obligation 
in Islam’ (Ibn Khattab, 1997). According to his family, Khattab viewed Islam as inclusive of ‘all except 
those who sow discord and unrest’ (Ibn Khattab, 2002). He quickly gained military experience in 
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Afghanistan, earning a reputation as a brave and courageous leader (Moore & Tumelty, 2008). After 
the war ended, Khattab sought to mobilise volunteers in support of embattled Islamic communities 
in Tajikistan (Ibn Khattab, undated), leading one of three groups that became involved in the conflict 
there. However, it was his actions in the North Caucasus that brought him to prominence. For 
Khattab, the international community, notably the United Nations, had failed to protect Muslims in 
Afghanistan, Tajikistan, or Bosnia. The Arab mujahideen in the North Caucasus were consequently 
organised around a reading of jihad as an individual duty or obligation (fard al-ayn) to defend the 
global community of Muslims, or umma, directed against the non-Muslim occupation of Muslim 
lands.  Whereas socio-revolutionary Islam focused on challenges to domestic politic norms, the pan-
Islamist understanding of jihad that focused on the umma enable a form of transnational activism 
directed towards supporting oppressed Muslim communities. Khattab’s vision of jihad, however, 
differed sharply from the emergent discourse associated with al-Qaeda (AQ).
Personal ties and trust were central to the network that Khattab established. Following Azzam’s lead, 
Khattab implemented a model where individuals of any nationality could join his forces. However, 
he also ensured that any prospective recruits were vetted. Thus, Khattab organised his cadre of 
foreign fighters around a small, trusted inner circle of aides, all of whom had fought alongside him 
in Tajikistan or been involved in Azzam’s training camps in Pakistan. With the exception of the 
Egyptian Abu Bakr Aqeedah, the nucleus of the group appears to have been Saudi. It included 
Hakim al-Medani, Abu Omar al-Nadji, Abu Walid al-Ghamidi, Sahel al-Owfi, Khalid al-Subai, and 
Abu Musab (possibly al-Tabuki). In total, around 80 Arab volunteers participated in the first Chechen 
war. Khattab’s group launched a series of ambush operations in early 1996 in support of Chechen 
rebels, bringing him to the attention of local militia leader Shamil Basayev. It was the relationship 
between Khattab and Basayev that was to be critical to the growth of the foreign fighter movement 
in the North Caucasus. Consequently, the emergence and success of the foreign fighters depended 
not just on military leadership, but also on the transnational ideologues and the local allies who 
inspired and legitimised their presence.
FOREIGN FIGHTERS INTEGRAL TO STATE-BUILDING EFFORTS, LEFT LASTING LEGACY
Following the Khasavyurt Accords, signed in August 1996 to mark the end of the First Chechen 
War, the Chechen leadership focused on ensuring the withdrawal of Russian troops. Aslan 
Maskhadov, Akhmed Zakayev, Movladi Udugov and Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev all took lead roles in 
the negotiations overseen by the OSCE, which culminated in a peace treaty signed by Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin and Maskhadov in Moscow in May 1997. At the same time, Yandarbiyev and 
others continued to promote shari’a law. In September 1996, Yandarbiyev, as acting ChRI President, 
issued a decree introducing a shari’a-based criminal code. He also declared the 1994-1996 war 
a jihad. In October 1996, he met with Sheikh Fathi and the newly arrived young Saudi religious 
advisor, Abu Omar al-Sayf (Voice of the Caucasus, undated). This meeting provided the foundation 
and theological rationale for embracing shari’a law and establishing the Shari’a Guard paramilitary 
group. In December 1996, Yandarbiyev issued a series of statements embedding shari’a in the new 
constitution, before stepping down to contest the January 1997 presidential elections.
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Although Yandarbiyev’s views on the nature of the first role and the preferred role for shari’a were 
not widely held – as evidenced by his defeat by Maskhadov in those elections – his stance attracted 
external support. Al-Sayf had some knowledge of both Islamic and jihadist doctrines, having 
studied before travelling to Pakistan in the early 1990s. On his arrival in the North Caucasus, he 
quickly linked up with Khattab’s group, and it was Al-Sayf – working alongside Jordanian-Chechen 
ideologues – who provided the financial support for the integration of the foreign fighters into the 
newly formed ChRI state structures. Thus, the alliance of foreign fighters and influential local allies 
helped the foreign fighter movement integrate itself into ChRI state-building efforts. Yandarbiyev 
was able to use his position as interim president to support the shift towards a more overt reading 
of Islam, while Sheikh Fathi and Al-Sayf were integral to the establishment of the Shari’a Guard. 
Despite their defeat in the elections, former members of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) such 
as Yandarbiyev began to agitate for control and influence beyond the newly formed government. 
Maskhadov was acutely aware of the significance of local Islamist groups, even though he was 
elected on a secular mandate. Isa Umarov, religious advisor to late ChRI President Dzhokhar 
Dudayev, and Yandarbiyev continued to support the activities of the Shari’a Guard. Islam Khalimov, 
who had been involved in the Jundullah Brigade – the only Chechen Islamist fighting unit during the 
first war – was appointed Interior Minister and focused on developing the Shari’a Guard in late 1996 
and 1997. He appointed Supyan Abdullayev and Abdul Malik Mezhidov as deputies who oversaw 
the Shari’a Guard. Abdullayev – who later acted as a close advisor to Dokka Umarov, the man who 
was to abolish the ChRI and replace it with the explicitly jihadist Imarat Kavkaz (IK) – had been a 
member of the IRP in the early 1990s, before aligning with the Jundullah Brigade.
This group coalesced around a vision of Islamic activism focused on resisting federal pressure on 
Chechnya. Khattab, however, also retained close ties to other foreign veterans, including Abu Jafar 
al-Yemeni, Abu Quteyba al-Libi, and Abu Khalid. Khattab created a movement that was multinational 
in character, with a handful of activists joining after the war in Bosnia faltered in early 1996. 
Alongside them, local Chechen paramilitary groups increased their influence, particularly the Islamic 
Battalions and the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR). Khattab’s training camps would also 
prove crucial in later sustaining the movement, and provided a model for other groups to emulate. 
He ensured that his foreign fighter network became embedded locally and therefore was more 
resilient, and he integrated local ideologues and financiers. Khattab’s influence also continues to 
resonate in other ways: His name and ideas featuring in the wider jihadi literature, and he pioneered 
certain media tactics, such as videotaping operations and establishing a multilingual portal for 
disseminating statements. The legacy of the foreign fighter movement, moreover, outlasted their 
direct involvement, and many key indigenous leaders – such as Dagestan’s Magomed Vagabov and 
Kabardino-Balkaria’s Anzor Astemirov – benefited both from religious training abroad and links to 
the Khattab/Basayev networks. At the same time, the foreign fighter movement that Khattab to 
a large degree symbolised was not unitary, with contestation between Jordanian Chechens and 
Saudis in particular.
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FOREIGN FIGHTERS FAILED TO ADAPT TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES 
The foreign fighter movement in the North Caucasus drew support from a range of locations. As 
already indicated, some came from Bosnia and the Balkans, but many travelled with Khattab from 
Tajikistan. Members of ethnic groups from Central Asia and the wider Caucasus region (e.g. Nogay, 
Azeri) were initially welcomed to the training camps in the interwar period. Shared languages and 
culture (Russian and Turkish) and the ability to travel to the region, coupled with access to informal 
support networks in and around Chechnya, facilitated the growth of their networks. Moreover, the 
foreign fighter movement could claim some success as a result of the first war, which boosted its 
appeal. At the same time, Khattab appears to have tried to manage the growth and professionalism 
of the foreign fighter network. Although a small number of Yemeni, Egyptian, and Algerian volunteers 
arrived after 1995 via staging points in Baku and the Pankisi Gorge, few of them succeeded in 
integrating themselves into Khattab’s network. He also appears to have restricted the influence of 
the Central Asian networks amid fears they were infiltrated by informers. 
The early success of the foreign fighter movement in the North Caucasus in some ways laid the 
foundations for its decline. The raid on Buynaksk in December 1997 and the invasion of Dagestan 
in summer 1999, which triggered the second war, failed to spark a popular revolt. Many key figures 
were killed in Dagestan, the battle for and retreat from Groznyy, and in Komsomolskoye in 1999-
2000, and the invasion was seen as a mistake, leading some who were able to do so to leave. The 
foreign fighter networks suffered further losses in 2001, Khattab was killed in March 2002, and 
many of those remaining were killed under Khattab’s successors, Abu Walid (died April 2004) and 
Abu Qutaybah (died July 2004). Moreover, the international environment was changing: As Al-Sayf 
noted, the 9/11 attacks and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 drained any vestiges of support in Saudi 
circles. The death of Al-Sayf in 2005 and Abu Qutaybah’s successor, Abu Hafs al-Urdani, in 2006 
effectively ended the involvement of Khattab’s foreign fighter network in the insurgency, with the 
remaining fighters essentially incorporated into local units. Over time, the foreign fighter movement 
increasingly relied on small local and regional networks and on on-going support from the foreign 
fighters who had returned to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Turkey. Neighbouring countries became 
important hubs for the foreign fighter networks, providing support, training and recruits, and a small 
number of foreign fighters were aligned to groups in the Chechen highlands – particularly around 
Vedeno – and Dagestan. As a result, by 2007 the foreign fighter networks were more Turkic than 
Arabic, as illustrated by court proceedings in Baku, where 16 people were convicted of involvement 
in insurgent groups (Turan News Agency).
The degradation of the insurgency in which the foreign fighter network was embedded was another 
important factor in explaining its decline. The inability to control territory curtailed the operation of 
the training camps. The federal authorities succeeded in co-opting influential local actors, such as the 
Kadyrovs and the Yamadayevs, who, over time, established a semi-autonomous form of governance 
in Chechnya. As the insurgency’s fortunes deteriorated, many local fighters accepted amnesties and 
changed sides – an option not available to the foreign fighters, who were consequently trapped. 
Pressure from the local authorities and the FSB on the remaining groups forced foreign fighters to 
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increasingly rely on small, trusted networks, and some found it difficult to establish contact with 
local militant groups. Some foreign fighters struggled as a result of language and cultural difficulties, 
and those who succeeded, such as key Saudi and Yemeni figures, relied on local deputies to link 
them to local communities. Although the foreign fighters demonstrated considerable resiliency, 
the reliance on personal trust networks created difficulties achieving continuity and succession 
when key personnel, local and foreign, were killed. The gradual weakening of the foreign fighter 
infrastructure was indicated by the delays in announcing the deaths of Khattab’s successor, Abu 
Walid al-Ghamdi, in early 2004 and Al-Sayf in late 2005. Although the last senior foreign fighter, 
Mokhannad, was not killed until 2011, by that point the movement had ceased to play a significant 
role in the insurgency. 
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PART FOUR: INTERPRETING THE EVOLUTION AND DECLINE OF 
AN INSURGENCY
Learning lessons from one conflict can help us better understand developments in another. The 
North Caucasus has been a site of conflict since the Soviet Union’s collapse, and the evolution 
and decline of armed opposition to the state offers valuable insights into insurgent leadership, 
succession, ideological change, and appeal. This final section builds on part three by examining the 
broader failure of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (ChRI) and Imarat Kavkaz (IK) state-building 
projects and offers the following conclusions:
• Insurgencies are best understood not simply as collections of hierarchical paramilitary 
units, but as social movements whose leaders must balance their own needs and agendas 
with those of members if they are to be successful.
• Clandestine groups often have succession plans in place, even if these are not publicised. 
However, succession is a negotiated process that is vulnerable to external interference 
and difficult to achieve in the event of recurring leadership losses.
• Weakness was a key factor driving the ideological evolution of the North Caucasus 
insurgency. Rebel leaders continually sought to expand the insurgency’s constituency as 
its core support weakened, but changing conditions and a perception it had reached a 
dead end undermined its appeal.
• The loss of the IK’s indigenous ideologists diluted its unique identity and its ability to 
respond to developments, suggesting insurgent groups may be as dependent on the 
strength of their ideological cadres as their combat ones. The IK’s ability to function and 
recruit was also undermined by low levels of trust and morale, which were exacerbated by 
security service behaviour.
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INSURGENT LEADERS BALANCE COMPETING INTERESTS IN PURSUING THEIR AGENDA
The language used to describe groups engaged in terrorism and political violence often mirrors 
that of militaries, with leaders positioned at the apex and issuing orders to subordinates. In many 
ways, this is understandable: insurgent groups themselves frequently employ military terminology, 
and groups often function as military units when directly engaged in combat operations. Moreover, 
leaders are widely understood as playing important roles in all types of movements: as McAdam 
has noted, ‘in the context of political opportunity and widespread discontent there still remains a 
need for the centralised direction and coordination of a recognised leadership’ (McAdam, 1999, 
47). For this reason, the study of leadership in social movements has tended to focus on charismatic 
leadership and its capacity to mobilise people.
Nevertheless, drawing parallels with the hierarchical structures of militaries is often a misleading 
way of conceiving of leadership as a whole within insurgent movements. Many groups deliberately 
employ decentralised, cell structures: Leaders are important components, but the existence 
of the group is not contingent on their survival – something that Khattab explicitly argued (al-
Nowaiser, 2002). Leadership is, moreover, often explicitly linked to opportunities in particular 
historical, cultural, social, and political environments, and social and political ‘capital’ may not be 
transferable between settings. Conversely, individuals with low standing in one milieu may assume 
a prominent role in another – contrast, for example, the widespread contempt in Chechen society 
for Movladi Udugov (Derluguian, 2005) with his leading role in shaping the ideological direction 
of the insurgency. Leadership is also relational and enabled by a social network, and can depend 
on the personal characteristics – experience, training, reputation, etc. – of the leader. As Melucci 
(1996) argues, in a relational setting, leaders act as representatives of their group and are expected 
to advance its interests, in return for which they are afforded ‘status, loyalty, prestige, and power.’ 
In settings where ‘ideological identification is more elastic, alliances and fusions are more probable’ 
(Melucci, 1996, 326). However, if the relational benefits are neither fair, nor equitable, leaders may 
sever the link to other external groups, or supporters.  
Different types of leader can address the challenges of negotiating leadership in different ways. 
ChRI President Aslan Maskhadov was, first and foremost, a military commander, and throughout his 
tenure he sought to balance the interests of competing factions within the ChRI to achieve a united 
front. As such, he vacillated between appeasing and suppressing the Islamists (Wilhelmsen, 2004), 
but his position was weakened by a lack of external support and the loss of many allies (Moore, 
2010). His letters reveal his on-going efforts to maintain the support of and control influential 
commander Shamil Basayev, and his recurring frustration at the independent actions of Ruslan 
Gelayev (Akhmadov, 2013). A rapprochement did occur between the two separate military, religious, 
and political command structures – the State Defence Committee led by Maskhadov and the Majlis 
al-Shura aligned to Shamil Basayev – in June 2002, but this was only possible after the foreign 
fighter movement suffered major losses, including Khattab himself. Dokka Umarov, the leader who 
abolished the ChRI and replaced it with the IK, was similarly a military leader who sought to balance 
competing interests within the insurgency. His statements testify to the pressures both from 
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the younger generation of fighters and those from outside Chechnya for ideological change, and 
Umarov’s personal shift to jihadism post-dated that of the movement that he led. This highlights 
how ideology and leadership are two-way, interactive processes, and how a leader’s control over 
a movement can be maintained by ideological flexibility and accommodating demands from within 
the insurgency (Youngman, 2016a). By contrast, Aliaskhab Kebekov, Umarov’s successor, was an 
ideological leader who appeared to prioritise adherence to a particular strand of jihadist ideology 
over movement unity. Thus, when the Syrian conflict created bottom-up pressures for change, 
he ceased to be able to balance the competing interests – with the breaking of the relationships 
manifested in the widespread defections to IS. Kebekov’s opponents, by contrast, avoided offering 
explicit arguments of how defecting would improve the situation in the insurgency, drawing on the 
emotional appeal of the ‘caliphate’ and allowing followers to project onto the movement their own 
goals and aspirations (Youngman, 2016b).
SUCCESSION A NEGOTIATED PROCESS THAT BECOMES CUMULATIVELY DIFFICULT
Even within decentralised movements, leaders often have succession plans in place, as they seek 
to ensure the survival of the movement and the continuation of their own political and ideological 
preferences. Plans can differ significantly: in some cases, successors are publicly designated; in 
others, there may be an acknowledged ‘logical’ successor; and in yet others succession plans may 
only be known to a trusted inner circle. Maskhadov, for example, appointed Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev 
as ChRI vice president, as did Sadulayev Umarov several years later; as such, when both died, a 
legal heir was in place. When Kebekov was killed in April 2015, leadership of the IK transitioned 
naturally to Magomed Suleymanov, his close ally and one of the few surviving IK loyalists. At the 
same time, having a designated heir can be dangerous. The IK, for example, split in 2010-2011 
when a group led by his chosen successor, Aslambek Vadalov, sought to oust Umarov. The nature 
of the attempted coup may explain why Umarov did not have a designated successor in place when 
he died in September 2013.
Succession can depend on a number of factors. Succession plan may not be known, or may be 
disrupted – if, for example, the intended successor is killed around the same time as the leader. 
Furthermore, a logical consequence of viewing leadership as involving the balancing of interests is 
that succession should be understood as a negotiated process. This is arguably even truer of jihadist 
as opposed to other types of insurgent groups: pledges of bayah, or allegiance, are to individual 
leaders, not groups, meaning the death of leaders can create opportunities to renegotiate alliances. 
The personal authority of any successor, as well as the position adopted by other influential figures 
– and potential competitors – within the movement are important. Sadulayev’s and Umarov’s 
leadership bids were clearly strengthened by support from Basayev, helping assuage the concerns 
of influential ideologues like Anzor Astemirov, whereas Vadalov’s challenge foundered due to a lack 
of support from key rebels in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria – which at the time were the focal 
points of insurgent violence. Moreover, insurgent leaders face challenges in negotiating competing 
interests that non-clandestine group do not, and state opponents can seek to exploit these. This was 
most clearly seen with Kebekov’s ascension to the IK leadership. Umarov was killed in September 
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2013, but the regional leadership were unable to meet to agree a successor. It took six months of 
negotiations conducted using USB sticks and involving actors in Turkey for a mutually acceptable 
candidate to be agreed upon, with the absence of personal relationships between the parties 
playing an important role. In the meantime, security services in the North Caucasus intercepted and 
leaked details of the negotiations in an apparent attempt to exacerbate disagreements and foster 
uncertainty. These issues were only resolved in March 2014, when Kebekov proclaimed himself 
the new IK leader. Similarly, the IK leadership’s efforts to resolve the disagreements over IS were 
severely hindered by the inability of rebel leaders to communicate with one another – again with a 
reliance on USB sticks that did not always reach their destination (Youngman, 2016b).
Existing literature (Cronin, 2009) shows that the death or arrest of a leader can have varying effects, 
sometimes leading to the demise of the group, at others to its rejuvenation. Evidence from the North 
Caucasus supports this. In Ingushetia, the arrest of Emir Magas and the death of Said Buryatskiy 
in early 2010 effectively crippled that branch of the insurgency, and it has never recovered. By 
contrast, the death of Anzor Astemirov in Kabardino-Balkaria in March 2010 led to an upsurge of 
attacks, demonstrating how leaders can restrain as well as exacerbate violence. The death of his 
successor, by contrast, prompted a sharp decline. However, there has been very little research on the 
cumulative effect of leadership losses and their impact on succession planning. Logic would suggest 
that sustained losses, particularly over a short period of time, make it harder to put succession plans 
in place and ensure a smooth leadership transition. In Kabardino-Balkaria, the insurgent leadership 
was decimated by successive operations that eliminated much of its leadership cadre, and the 
insurgency there has all but disappeared. In Dagestan, most of the leadership positions are now 
vacant because of sustained security service pressure. Insurgencies do not have infinite personnel 
resources with which to replace losses, particularly if they are already suffering from recruitment 
problems. Nevertheless, it is clearly an area requiring further research.
WEAKNESS A KEY DRIVER OF IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE INSURGENCY
Over the course of its existence, the ideology of first the ChRI and then the IK underwent a gradual 
transformation. The First Chechen War (1994-1996) was predominantly nationalist, with Islam 
playing only a subsidiary, instrumental role (Hughes, 2007). However, the region-wide process of 
post-Soviet Islamic revival occurred in Chechnya in the context of – and was accelerated by – war 
(Gammer, 2011), and a loose Islamist camp formed within the separatist movement. It was this 
camp that repeatedly challenged Maskhadov’s leadership and that he sought to appease. Ultimately, 
however, it came to dominate the entire insurgency. The transformation continued under Sadulayev 
and then Umarov. Umarov was a nationalist-separatist who portrayed Russia as a colonial force 
occupying Chechnya. With the proclamation of the IK, his portrayal changed dramatically, with 
religion becoming its defining characteristic. At the same time, he continued to prioritise Russia and 
paid little heed to international affairs. From late 2010 onwards, however, the hierarchy of enemies 
became increasingly blurred as he demonstrated an increasing in global events (Youngman, 2016a). 
Under his successors, this interest became even more prominent as events in Syria developed and 
the involvement of ethnic North Caucasians became clear. Kebekov moved the IK closer to al-
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Qaeda (AQ) than had previously been the case, and placed himself in clear opposition to the Islamic 
State (IS). Suleymanov continued these policies during his short leadership.
Weakness was a key factor in explaining both the ideological transformation and the long-term 
decline of the insurgency. Maskhadov’s ability to counter the influence of the insurgency’s Islamist 
wing was continually undermined by Russian security service operations that targeted his supporters. 
Russian state policy thus facilitated, arguably deliberately, the radicalisation of the insurgency. By 
the time Umarov assumed the ChRI leadership in June 2006, the insurgency was in a perilous state. 
The deaths of Maskhadov and Sadulayev – coupled with a general amnesty and the co-option 
of former insurgents into the ranks of forces under the control of Kremlin-appointed leaders 
Akhmad Kadyrov and his son and successor Ramzan – drained the insurgency and necessitated 
the replacement of key military and ideological leaders. It was clear that the insurgency needed 
to expand its appeal if it were to survive. Religion had historically proven to be the best means of 
appealing to the wider region and provided a ready-made sense of common identity for appealing 
to and beyond it. Moreover, both the younger generation of insurgents and those in Dagestan 
and Kabardino-Balkaria were pushing for an ideology that represented their interests more closely 
than Chechen nationalism. The weakening of the Chechen core reduced its dominance over the 
insurgency’s ideological orientation and its ability to withstand bottom-up pressures. With this 
and each subsequent shift in focus, the leadership sough to expand its support base – first from 
Chechnya to the wider region, then to Russia’s Muslims, and finally to the global community of 
Muslims and jihadists elsewhere – because its original support base was no longer sufficient. 
The soft policies pursued by the authorities from 2010 onwards (see Part Two) only served to 
further weaken the insurgency’s appeal. Extremist ideologies always seek to tap into and shape 
perceptions of existing grievances, and addressing some of these undermined the insurgency’s 
support base and recruitment potential. The rehabilitation commissions, in particular, encouraged 
those only peripherally engaged or disillusioned to disengage, and appear to have had the greatest 
success in Ingushetia – not coincidentally, the republic where soft policies have been pursued 
with the greatest sincerity. By the time IS emerged in the region, the IK was already in critical 
decline. Furthermore, the appeal of the Syrian conflict for would-be recruits in the North Caucasus 
cannot be viewed in isolation from the situation at home: IS’ extensive propaganda output and the 
international media coverage it received, particularly in 2014-2015, served to create the impression 
of an insurgency that was winning, or at the very least capable of it. This stood in stark contrast to 
the North Caucasus, where even IK loyalists publicly admitted the insurgency had reached a dead-
end. The increased security service pressure in the run-up to the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi 
created an even more challenging operating environment, and the continuation of these policies 
post-Sochi has resulted in the almost total decimation of the insurgency across the region. These 
practical difficulties only served to increase the appeal of Syria as an alternative, and the insurgent 
leaders who defected to IS sought to adapt their ideological appeal in response.
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LOSS OF IDEOLOGISTS, LOW TRUST HAD A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE INSURGENCY’S 
APPEAL
Several factors negatively impacted the insurgency’s attractiveness and ability to function and 
recruit, and therefore to counter the negative processes influencing ideological change. One of 
these was that, by 2011, it had lost many of its indigenous ideologists, key figures such as Astemirov, 
Buryatskiy, and Supyan Abdullayev. Although the short-term impact of their deaths varied, it was 
these individuals who were able to translate pan-Islamic narratives of jihad to local audiences. 
Without them, the IK lost much of its distinct ideological identity and struggled to respond to 
changing circumstances. Thus, the IK was poorly placed to respond to the challenges of the Syrian 
conflict, and Kebekov’s decision to move the IK closer to AQ occurred at a time when the two 
movements were arguably at their lowest ebb. Absent indigenous ideologists on the ground, the 
North Caucasus insurgency was unable to combat perceptions that it had reached a dead-end. This 
suggests insurgent movements may be as dependent on the depth of their ideological cadres as 
their combat ones, as well as heavily impact by the availability of more attractive alternatives.
Another important consideration in considering the insurgency’s ability to recruit is the low levels 
of trust and morale. The statements of rebel leaders in the North Caucasus and Syria are replete 
with references to mistrust, the threat posed by informants, and the constraining effects this has 
on mobilisation. Muslim al-Shishani’s complaints that he could not re-join the insurgency after his 
release from prison because of suspicion he may have been turned are indicative of this problem. 
For this reason, leaders such as Umarov repeatedly recommended that would-be recruits carry out 
independent actions rather than attempting to join up with existing insurgent groups. The impact 
of informants appears to have been particularly telling in the case of Kabardino-Balkaria, where the 
security services twice succeeded in wiping out the majority of the leadership. This led Islam Din, 
the ‘official’ website for that branch, to lament the failure to follow basic security procedures.
Federal and North Caucasian security services have actively sought to exacerbate these problems 
of mistrust and low morale, although only some of the methods are replicable in law-governed 
states. For example, following the arrest of Magas, Russian media widely reported that he was 
collaborating with the investigation, even though neither his behaviour in court nor his sentence 
reflected any such position. A lengthy delay between his arrest and it being publicly reported 
served the purpose of exacerbating rebel concerns that any information he had could have been 
compromised. In Dagestan, the website Kavkazpress is used by the federal security services to leak 
compromising information, and it appears to have been used to turn internal discussions about 
whether to pledge allegiance to IS into public disputes. The Chechen authorities, meanwhile, 
have been particularly active in targeting the relatives of those suspected of involvement in the 
insurgency destroying their houses and/or instigating their expulsion from native villages. These 
measures are a violation of domestic and international law, but arguably have produced short-term 
gains in domestic security. Their illegality, however, makes it doubtful whether the Chechen model 
of counterinsurgency can serve as a model for other areas, and on-going social unrest casts doubts 
on the long-term ‘success’ of that model.
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APPENDIX A: OFFICIAL ESTIMATES OF NUMBERS FIGHTING IN SYRIA AND IRAQ
Russian, Federal
Date Official, agency Figure Source URL
16/12/14 Yevgeniy Ilin, National Antiterrorism Committee 850
http://itar-tass.com/
politika/1649861
16/1/15 Ilyas Rogachev, Foreign Ministry 800 http://echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/1474324-echo/
20/2/15 Aleskandr Bortnikov, Federal Security Service (FSB) 1,700
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/
article/516282.html
28/5/15 Gennadiy Gatilov, Foreign Ministry 500 http://tass.ru/politika/2001185
22/6/15 Nikolay Patrushev, Security Council 1,000 http://kommersant.ru/doc/2752250




9/7/15 Sergey Lavrov, Foreign Ministry 2,000 http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/525373.html





15/10/15 Aleksandr Gorovoy, Interior Ministry 2,500 http://www.interfax-russia.ru/main.asp?id=662733
19/11/15 Oleg Syromolotov, Foreign Ministry 2,719 http://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/1698091.html
17/12/15 Aleskandr Bornikov, FSB 2,900 http://www.currenttime.tv/content/article/27428128.html
17/3/16 Vladimir Makarov, Interior Ministry 3,417 http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/279282/
18/4/16 Aleksandr Bastrykin, Investigative Com-mittee 1,000
http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/2961578
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23/2/17 Vladimir Putin, Russian President 4,000 https://www.gazeta.ru/army/news/9721685.shtml









25/7/14 Sergey Kmennyy, FSB, Kabardino-Balka-ria 60
http://regnum.ru/news/1829616.
html
16/6/15 Apti Alaudinov, Interior Ministry, Chech-nya 405
http://ria.ru/
world/20150616/1071864684.html
29/10/15 Yunus-bek Yevkurov, head, Ingushetia 30
http://www.kp.ru/
daily/26452.4/3321798/




11/12/15 Abdurashid Magomedov, Interior Minis-try, Dagestan 900
http://www.kommersant.ru/
doc/2867295
19/10/16 Yunus-bek Yevkurov, head, Ingushetia 87
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/
articles/291176/
13/12/16 Yunus-bek Yevkurov, head, Ingushetia 97
http://kavkasia.net/
Russia/2016/1481683747.php
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26/1/17 Yuriy Muravyev, Interior Ministry, In-gushetia 200 http://kavtoday.ru/27039
28/2/17 Igor Romashkin, Interior Ministry, Kab-ardino-Balkaria 175
http://www.interfax-russia.ru/South/
news.asp?id=811297&sec=1671
Commonwealth of Independent States
29/3/16 State Security Service, Georgia 50 http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/279924/ 
1/4/16 Interior Ministry, Kyrgyzstan 508 http://www.interfax.ru/world/501481
19/9/16 Ramazon Rakhimzod, Interior Ministry, Tajikistan 1,100
https://rus.ozodi.org/a/28001676.
html
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APPENDIX B: OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN ‘RUSSIAN-SPEAKING’ GROUPS 
This appendix provides a brief overview of the main groups that have involved citizens from former 
Soviet states. Such groups have frequently split, united, or renamed themselves, creating challenges 
in tracking their heritage. Furthermore, most of the groups have ceased to maintain a durable online 
presence due to website and social media account shutdowns and the deaths of media operatives. 
Instead, their digital presence is often maintained through more closed platforms like Telegram 
and WhatsApp, making the groups harder to track. Much of the limited media reporting on the 
groups is reliant on unverifiable self-reporting via private channels; although it pays lip service to 
the limitations of the information, this often does not carry through to the analysis and the in-depth 
contextual knowledge required to critically examine it is often lacking. Finally, some groups publish 
material in languages such as Chechen and Uzbek, as well as Arabic, which the authors of this report 
do not speak and therefore cannot evaluate. To aid readability, throughout the paper individuals are 
only referred to by either their real name or kunya.
Jaysh al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar (JMA)
JMA was formed in March 2013 when Katibat al-Muhajirin (the Migrant Brigade), led by Umar al-
Shishani, merged with several smaller groups. It was the primary destination for Russian-speaking 
foreign fighters until late 2013. However, the first of many fractures within the group occurred in 
August 2013, when Seyfullakh al-Shishani broke away in acrimonious circumstances to form his own 
group (see Seyfullakh’s Jama’at). When Umar al-Shishani pledged allegiance to IS (then still ISIL) in 
November 2013, he took a considerable number – possibly a majority – of JMA’s Russian-speaking 
fighters with him. Those who refused to join IS took on the JMA name, under the leadership of 
Salakhuddin al-Shishani, and the group initially remained one of the key destinations for Russian-
speaking fighters. Over time, however, non-Russian speakers came to dominate JMA and, with the 
ouster of Salakhuddin and his military emir, Abdul-Karim Krymskiy, in mid-2015, it ceased to be a 
significant player among fighters from former Soviet countries.
Jaysh al-Khilafah al-Islamiya
Seyfullakh al-Shishani was one of the most prominent figures in JMA-produced material until he 
either left or was ejected (proffered reasons for his departure include disagreements with the 
leadership over strategy, excessive self-promotion, being overly enthusiastic in declaring others to 
be infidels, and embezzlement). Seyfullakh established a small group, comprised mainly of defectors 
from JMA, which went through several name changes in a short period of time, including Jaysh al-
Khilafah al-Islamiya. After Seyfullakh’s death in Aleppo in February 2014, the faction was led first 
by Mokhammad al-Khorasani and then Abu Ubayda al-Shishani, and was also known by the name 
Seyfullakh’s Jama’at. Under Seyfullakh, the group enjoyed good relations with Jund al-Sham and 
Ansar al-Sham (with which it temporarily merged), but ultimately joined Jabhat al-Nusrah. 
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Islamic State (IS)
IS became one of the main groups featuring ‘Russian-speaking’ fighters with Umar al-Shishani’s 
defection from JMA and his subsequent appointment as Northern Sector commander, attracting 
both North Caucasian and Central Asian fighters. Fighters have concentrated into numerous smaller 
units, including Kavkazskiy Dom, the Abu Khanif Jama’at, the Azerbaijani Jama’at, the Sabri Jama’at 
and the Akhmad Battalion. The proclamation of the ‘caliphate’ appeared to result in a significant 
recruitment boost, but the Russian-speaking groups also suffered significant losses, such as in 
fighting around Kobani. Significant figures include Abu Dzhikhad, an ethnic Karachay responsible for 
overseeing IS’ Russian-language output, and Akhmad Chatayev, implicated in IS attacks in Turkey.
Imarat Kavkaz in Syria (IKS)
Salakhuddin al-Shishani and Abdul-Karim Krymskiy established IKS following their removal from 
JMA in mid-2015, explicitly subordinating his remaining Russian-speaking followers to the Imarat 
Kavkaz (IK) in the North Caucasus at a time when the IK was collapsing. There is little evidence 
to suggest that the group, which operated mainly around Aleppo and in Latakia, had a significant 
impact on the dynamics of the conflict. Much like JMA, it is rumoured to have suffered from internal 
divisions linked to the decline of the IK and contestation among its surviving representatives in 
Turkey (Paraszczuk, 2016). Salakhuddin was removed from his leadership role in December 2015.
Jaysh al-Usro
Upon his departure from IKS, Salakhuddin established Jaysh al-Usro with a handful of North 
Caucasian fighters and a few hundred local allies and continued to operate around Aleppo and in 
Latakia (Paraszczuk, 2016). The perpetual divisions within groups led by Salakhuddin have not had a 
positive impact on their influence, and Jaysh al-Usro is an even more marginal player in the conflict 
than IKS was.
Jabhat al-Nusrah
In addition to Seyfullakh’s Jama’at, fighters from the former Soviet Union are also present in the 
Turkish Jama’at. There is limited open source information available as to the strength of Jabhat al-
Nusrah’s Russian-speaking contingent.
Adzhnad al-Kavkaz
Adzhnad al-Kavkaz is a relatively small group led by Abdul Khakim al-Shishani that has operated 
mainly in the Latakia region. It has enjoyed good relations with Jaysh al-Khilafah al-Islamiya and 
Jund al-Sham. Its military emir is Khamza al-Shishani.  Its media output is mainly in Chechen and 
Arabic, and recruitment appears mainly to occur through trusted personal networks in refugee 
communities, particularly in Austria.
38
APPENDICES
‘RUSSIAN-SPEAKING’ FIGHTERS IN SYRIA, IRAQ AND AT HOME: CONSEQUENCES AND CONTEXT
Jund al-Sham
Jund al-Sham is another relatively small group led by Muslim al-Shishani that has operated mainly in 
the Latakia region. It has enjoyed good relations with Jaysh al-Khilafah al-Islamiya and Ansar al-Sham 
– it temporarily merged with them in 2014 – as well as Adzhnad al-Kavkaz (Jund al-Sham’s military 
emir, Abu Bakr al-Shishani, may have joined Adzhnad). The group has extensive links to German 
Salafi communities in Bonn, Berlin and Frankfurt (Steinberg, 2016) and has published propaganda 
material in German as well as Russian, English, and Arabic Muslim has repeatedly complained that 
the group lacks resources and called for the unification of non-IS groups.
Tarkhan’s Jama’at
Also known as Katibat Ibadu ar-Rakhman, Tarkhan’s jama’at is a small group under the command of 
Chechen rebel commander Tarkhan Gaziyev. In an interview, a representative of the group claimed 
that they left Chechnya for medical treatment in 2012 but want to return there if the opportunity 
arises. The representative also reported they are collaborating with the AQ-aligned Jaysh al-Fatah 
(now Tahrir al-Sham) and that Gaziyev himself is unable to travel to Syria for health reasons (Sham 
Center, 2016;he is believed to be in Turkey).
Imam Shamil Battalion
A statement claiming responsibility for the 3 April 2017 suicide attack on the St Petersburg metro 
claimed that the perpetrator, Akbarzhon Dzhalilov, carried out the attack ‘under the direction of 
Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri – may God preserve and care for him – and the Al-Qaeda Organization’ 
(Ani.mr, 2017). The authors have not observed any group to operate under this name in Syria; if 
such a group does exist, it may have been created specifically for the attack.
Islamic Jihad Union
The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) is an Uzbek group based in Waziristan along the Afghanistan/Pakistan 
border that broke away from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in 2002 after the fall of the 
Taliban; it was linked to planned attacks on the US Ramstein base and Uzbek and US consulates in 
Germany in 2007 and has cooperated closely with the Taliban and AQ (Wigen, 2009). The group has 
expressed support for insurgents in the North Caucasus, as well as encouraging Muslims in Russia 
to wage ‘solitary jihad’ (Islam Din, 2014). It has released video footage of its training camps in Syria.
Turkistan Islamic Party 
The Turkistan Islamic Party – also known as the Turkistan Islamic Movement and the East Turkistan 
Islamic Party – is a predominantly Uighur organisation that also has Uzbek members. It has historical 
links with the IMU, the IJU, the Taliban and AQ (Potter, 2013). and consists of Uighur and Uzbek 
militants and has reportedly joined the AQ-aligned Tahrir al-Sham coalition (Botobekov, 2017).
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Imam Bukhari Jama’at
The Imam Bukhari Jama’at is a predominantly Uzbek group that is effectively the Syrian affiliate of 
the IMU. The group split in October 2014 when its leaders pledged allegiance to IS, despite the 
IMU’s long-standing relationship with AQ and the Taliban; however, following retaliatory action 
against Uzbek militants in Afghanistan, the group appears to have reversed its position and joined 
the AQ-aligned Tahrir al-Sham coalition (Botobekov, 2017). Most of the group’s propaganda is in 
Uzbek and therefore inaccessible to the authors.
Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad
Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad is a group which consists mainly of ethnic Uzbeks from Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, and which has joined the AQ-aligned Tahrir al-Sham coalition (Botobekov, 2017).
Ansar al-Jihad
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APPENDIX C: KEY REBEL LEADERS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS AND SYRIA & IRAQ
Syria
Name Nom-de-Guerre/Kunya Position Status
Atabiyev, Islam Abu Dzhikhad IS propagandist Killed October 
2017
Azhiyev, Rustam Abdul Khakim al-Shis-
hani
Adzhnad al-Kavkaz emir Active
Batirashvili, 
Tarkhan
Umar al-Shishani IS Northern Sector emir Killed 7/2016
Chatayev, Akhmed Odnorukiy IS operative Active
Ruslan Machaliash-
vili 
Seyfullakh al-Shishani Emir of group that defected from 
JMA, known by multiple names
Killed 2/2014
Margoshvili, Feyzu-
lla (also known as 
Georgiy Kushtanash-
vili, Feyzul Baysarov)
Salakhuddin al-Shishani Jaysh al-Usro emir (former JMA, IKS 
emir)
Unknown
Margoshvili, Murad Muslim al-Shishani Jund al-Sham emir Active
Unknown Abu Musa al-Shishani Ansar al-Sham emir or military emir Active
North Caucasus
Abdulayev, Gadzhi Mukhammad Abu 
Dudzhana Gimrinskiy
IK Dagestan Wilayah Mountain Sec-
tor emir
Killed 8/2015
Abdullayev, Gasan Abu-Yasir IS/CW Dagestan Wilayah Southern 
Sector emir
Killed 6/2016
Abdullayev, Supyan Abu-Supyan IK deputy emir Killed 3/2011
Asilderov, Rustam Abu Mukhammad al-Ka-
dari
IS/CW emir Killed 12/2016
Astemirov, Anzor Seyfullakh IK United Wilayah of Kabarda, 
Balkaria and Karachay emir
Killed 3/2010
Basayev, Shamil Abu Idris Rebel leader, various official posi-
tions within ChRI;
Killed 7/2006
Byutukayev, Aslan Khamzat IS/CW Nokhchiycho Wilayah 
(Chechen Province) emir
Active
Gaziyev, Tarkhan Chechen rebel leader (no formal 






IK Dagestan Wilayah Southern Sec-
tor emir
Killed 5/2016
Kebekov, Aliaskhab Ali Abu Mukhammad IK emir Killed 4/ 2015
Samer Sahil Abdal-
lah al-Suwaylim
Ibn Khattab Leader of the Arab foreign fighter 
movement in the North Caucasus
Killed 3/ 2002
Maskhadov, Aslan ChRI President Killed 3/ 2005.
Sadulayev, Ab-
dul-Khalim
ChRI President Killed 6/2006
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Saidov, Makhran Makhran, Yakub IS/CW Nokhchiycho Wilayah (Chechen 
Province) Eastern Sector emir
Active 
Shebzukhov, Zalim Salim IK United Wilayah of Kabarda, 




Abu Usman Gimrinskiy IK emir Killed 8/2015
Taziyev, Ali Magas IK G1alg1ayche Wilayah (Ingushe-
tian Province) emir
Arrested early 2010
Umarov, Dokka Dokka Abu Usman IK emir Killed 9/ 2013
Vadalov, Aslambek Chechen rebel leader (no formal 
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